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RACE AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF

Any examination of the racial implications of campaign finance
reform will quickly require confronting the central theme of
equality that animates so much of the reform effort in this arena.
If the core defect in the current system of financing political
campaigns is the way in which money translates into political
power, then any system that fails to curb the role of money in
elections will appear to redound inevitability to the detriment of
those least well off. And it is far from surprising that black
Americans, whose net wealth is significantly below that of whites,
have less money to invest in the returns of the political enterprise.
This Essay, however, introduces some cautionary notes to the
claim that an equality-basedreform strategy is necessarily required
to expand the opportunity for black political advancement. This
Essay makes two basic arguments. The first is that equality is an
extraordinarily slippery concept and one that does not easily
translate into anything resembling a likely reform agenda under
our constitutional framework. Second, and m6re significantly,
this Essay examines the actual success that black voters have had
in recent years and the way in which the current reform agenda
might actually disable recent advances. This Essay concludes that
should many of the current reforms come to pass, black activists
may find refuge in precisely the type of First Amendment liberty
arguments that typically are eschewed by the proponents of
equality-basedreforms.
The question of racial justice has never been far from the center
of legal oversight of the political process. Racial justice was the
critical issue in the direct assault on Jim Crow laws. It played a muted
role in the deep suspicion surrounding the constitutional elimination
of poll taxes' and emerged forefront in the legislative repudiation of
Race then emerged as the central equality
literacy tests.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (concluding that "a
State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it
makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard").
2. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights
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consideration in the second generation of voting cases challenging atlarge and multimember districting systems for their dilutive effect on
minority political opportunity. And, of course, racial considerations
-or their limits-animated the re-constitutionalization of politics in
the Shaw v. Reno3 line of cases.
But the racial considerations of campaign finance law have
remained curiously unexplored. Into this breach have stepped two
young scholars of the law of democracy, Terry Smith4 and Spencer
Overton
Each has sought to fill the void by addressing the
implications of both campaign finance law as currently structured and
its proposed reforms in light of their impact on the prospects for
further minority advances in the political arena. Each addresses an
important void in the literature. For Professor Smith, the issue is
whether the equality claims advanced by reform advocates can stand
independent of the erosion of constitutional protection for the right
to representation claims of minorities undermined by Shaw and its
progeny.6 For Professor Overton, the issue is the manner in which the
current system of campaign financing not only exacerbates social
disparities in wealth, but accentuates the racial divide in income and
family wealth.7 In Professor Smith's view, the problem demands a
more robust equal protection analysis for the entire arena of
campaign finance based upon considerations of equality.
As well developed in the early work of Peter Westen, the
equality claim is surprisingly difficult to ground in any stable set of
variables.8 I share in the concern that an attempt to formulate an
equality claim over campaign finance arrangements is likely to prove
unsatisfying. Moreover, unlike the equal protection domain pure, the
campaign finance arena has a competing formal constitutional
principle in the form of the First Amendment. Thus, in Buckley v.
Valeo,9 the Supreme Court has already unequivocally rejected as an
impermissible constitutional objective the equalization of influence or
speech opportunities. Despite a mild resuscitation in Austin v.

Act suspension of literacy tests).
3. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
4. Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics,79 N.C. L. REV. 1469 (2001).
5. Spencer Overton, Voices From The Past: Race, Privilege, and CampaignFinance,
79 N.C. L. REv. 1178 (2001).
6. Smith, supra note 4, at 1469.
7. Overton, supranote 5, at 1178.
8. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). This
point was pressed more fully at the Symposium by my former colleague, Sandy Levinson.
9. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,10 the main tenor of First
Amendment law is decidedly hostile to forging equality as the
animating principle in the campaign finance arena." Moreover, the
infusion of equality concerns drawn from equal protection law is
unlikely to push aside the ongoing force of deep-seated First
Amendment considerations in campaign finance law. 2
In this Essay, however, I do not want to focus on doctrine
standing alone. Increasingly, I find the debates over doctrine in
campaign finance context almost a side show to the issue of the
practicalities of funding and the real-world consequences of the
reform agenda.' 3 It is further worth noting that recent Supreme
Court decisions on campaign finance have moved increasingly in the
direction of analyzing the practical effects of even the underlying
constitutional doctrines on the actual functioning of politics. This
trend is evidenced by Justices Breyer and Kennedy in their recent
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC opinions, 4 and Justice
Thomas in his Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
FederalElection Commission opinion, 5 all of which clearly invoke the
concern that restrictive access to money may be a way of entrenching
or locking up prior distributions of power.
In keeping with this approach, we may begin by assuming for the
moment that the First Amendment is not an obstacle to greater
regulation of campaign financing. Let us further assume that the
relative inequality of access to wealth faced by black candidates, as
identified by Professor Smith, and by black voters and would-be
contributors, as identified by Professor Overton, give further impetus
to the demand for greater restriction on current campaign finance
practices. What would be the likely effect of a more regulated
10. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding regulation based on the perception that large
contributions are a form of corruption).
11. For a discussion of the central trends in campaign finance law, see generally
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY (1998).
12. For the main works on this issue, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and
UndemocraticConsequences of Campaign FinanceReform, 105 YALE LJ. 1049 (1996) and
Kathleen M. Sullivan, PoliticalMoney and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 663
(1997).
13. This issue is the central thrust of Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The
Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1705 (1999), and is an
animating concern in the treatment of campaign finance issues in SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF
ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (1998 & Supp. 2001).
14. 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 405 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
15. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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campaign environment on black political participation?
An
examination of the last election cycle indicates that the impact is not
quite so certain as some reform advocates would have it.
The most recent presidential election saw one million more black
voters head to the polls than four years before. 16 While blacks did not
increase as an overall percentage of the national vote, 7 the level of
participation in several targeted and essential states rose
significantly, 18 playing a crucial and almost decisive role in the
election. Whereas black voters accounted for only 10% of the
nationwide electorate, in Florida they constituted 16% of the
electorate, up from 10% in 1996, a 60% increase in participation. 9
Because these voters favored Al Gore over George Bush by a nineto-one margin, increased African-American participation was nearly
the decisive factor in delivering the state to Vice President Gore.'
Put most simply, the increased percentage of blacks who voted in the
Florida election is what caused the race there to be so close, and set
off a chain of events culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore.2' It can further be stated that, while black voting
strength did not determine the actual result of the election, black
voters influenced its course and started a significant debate about the
very nature of the electoral process and cries for its revision.
Though Florida is the most noteworthy example, it was by no
means the only state that experienced an increase in black voter
turnout. Other states with significant jumps in African-American
turnout, measured in relation to the electorate as a whole, include
Missouri, Mississippi, and Tennessee Less dramatic increases were
also noted in Texas, Alabama, Maryland, Illinois, North Carolina,
16. Marian Dozier, For Black Voters, Civic Right Hits Home; Election Irregularities
Rekindle Cries for Action, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fl.), Jan. 14, 2001, at
1A (noting the increase in turnout from 9.5 million black voters in 1996 to 10.5 million in
2000, though other sources place the 2000 number slightly lower).
17. In both 1996 and 2000, blacks comprised 10% of the electorate. See Lori
Rodriguez, Black Voter Turnout Unaltered: NAACP Drive Pays Off in Some Places,
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 9,2000, at 27A.
18. Other states showing an increase in black voter turnout as a percentage of the
electorate include: Missouri (from 5% in 1996 to 11% in 2000), Mississippi (27% to 34%),
Tennessee (13% to 20%). Jill Lawrence, Aggressive NAACP UrgedAfrican-Americans to
the Polls,USA TODAY, Dec. 8,2000, at 8A.
19. See Lawrence, supra note 18. Another source cites the increase in black turnout
in Florida at 65%. Editorial, Little Evidence of Election Conspiracy, TAMPA TRIB., Jan.
13,2001, at 10.
20. See Lawrence, supra note 18 (noting that nationally, 90% of black voters cast their
ballots for Al Gore).
21. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
22. Lawrence, supra note 18.
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New York, and California. 23 Several other states actually saw a
decrease in their percentage of blacks heading to the polls, 24 enough
so that the national percentage in 2000 remained the same as or

similar to that of 1996. Many of the states showing an increased
percentage of African-American voters were targeted because the

Democratic party viewed them as crucial if Al Gore was going to
prevail in the national election.
To consider only the national number belies the reality of the
2000 election. The states targeted by the National Voter Fund of the
NAACP were the same states that saw an increased black turnout at

the pollsO How was the increase in black voter participation
engineered? To a large extent, as with so many other facets of our
electoral process, the answer is money. The National Voter Fund
spent ten million dollars to register black voters and get them to the
polls 6 Through the use of registration drives and "knock-and-drag"
campaigns, most coordinated through black churches and their
ministers, the NAACP successfully increased participation.2 7 Though
not directly coordinating with the Democratic Party itself-churches
fearing for their 501(c)(3) status tread the partisan line delicately2church doors were thrown open to particular candidates courting the
black vote (who happened to be predominately Democrats).29
Ultimately, their efforts at the end of the campaign centered on
energizing and mobilizing black voters.

23. See Gary Fields & Jennifer Davit, Broken Ballot, America's Dysfunctional Voting
System (pt. 2), WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,2000, at Al.
24. In New Jersey, the percentage of black voters dropped from 13% to 11%. In
South Carolina, the percentage dropped from 25% to 22%. Michigan dropped from 13%
to 11%, and Pennsylvania went from 9% to 7%, though in these battleground states the
number reflects an increase in overall voter turnout, rather than a decline in black turnout.
See id.
25. See Lawrence, supra note 18.
26. See Michael A. Fletcher, In Targeted States, A Striking Turnout of Black Voters,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17,2000, at A29.
27. See id,
28. See, e.g., Don Latten & Elaine Herscher, S.F. CandidatesPreachingto the Choirs:
Brown, Ammiano Meet with Fans, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15, 1999, at A21 (describing
appearances of a candidate for mayor at a local black church, but noting the risky nature
of politicking and its impact on tax-exempt status).
29. See, e.g., Sonya Ross, Clinton Urges Black Voters to Support Gore, AP ONLINE,
Sept. 20, 2000 (noting President Clinton's appeal before a conference of church leaders
and the subsequent forum for his wife, Senate candidate, Hillary Rodham Clinton); Jody
Wilgoren, Just Before Election, Politics and Religion Mix Easily at a Michigan Church,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at A23 (chronicling the political activities of a Michigan
church).
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The conventional wisdom, echoed by Professor Smith, 3 is that
the best use of campaign funds is to chase after the marginal swing
voter. Thus, it is widely believed that in a tightly contested election,
as with the 2000 Presidential election, money should be used to target
the undecided median voter whose wavering loyalty might deliver
success on election day.31 Undoubtedly, the most effective medium to
reach such voters is television-hence Professor Smith's concern that
black voters are unlikely to be the subject of media-intensive
campaign appeals because blacks are not generally part of the swing
voter group.3 2 However, the next step of Professor Smith's
argument-namely that because of their predetermined status, black
potential voters are excluded as targets from campaign spending,
adopts too parsimonious a view of what it means to spend money on
political campaigns. In the 2000 Presidential election and in other
closely contested races, both political parties recognized that the
swing vote depended as much, if not more, on the composition of the
electorate, as it did on the decision of the individual undecided voter.
Because less than sixty percent of eligible voters participate, 33
candidates may be just as able to tip the scales on election day by
altering the mix of who votes, as by swinging the median voter from
among the most likely voters to actually turn out.
In this fashion, a close election may be won by drawing most
heavily from the poles, rather than from the center, as the
conventional wisdom would posit. To draw from the poles without
estranging the center requires different campaign strategies. By and
large, this strategy includes the use of radio and its more targeted
audience rather than television, and institutions capable of reaching
voters down to the individual level. Hence, the wonderfully named
"knock-and-drag" campaigns. These approaches tend to be relatively
more labor intensive than large scale media campaigns, and
paradoxically less expensive. By focusing on turnout of predictable
supporters, rather than winning the hearts of the undecided, parties
may spend their campaign dollars quite effectively, even if the
percentage of the campaign war chest spent in this fashion is still
small. With regard to the black vote in particular, this means that Al
Gore did not need to convince blacks to vote for him; he simply
30. Smith, supra note 4, at 1515.
31. See idl
32. Smith, supra note 4, at 1517-18.
33. The overall voter turnout in the national election included only 50.7% of those
eligible to participate. Yochi J. Dreazen, Voter Turnout Stays Low Despite Barrage of
Ads, Closeness of Race, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,2000, at A16.
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needed to convince them to vote. The evidence is clear that the
Democratic Party and Al Gore campaigned and spent money (as did
the NAACP) in this fashion.34
This form of campaign activity may fall below the radar screen of
those reform proponents looking at where the most dollars are spent.
But this does not mean that the process of energizing the base does
not face obstacles in the world of proposed reforms. Campaign
finance reform proposals pose some threat to this typical and
important type of activity in black communities. Though churches
already take care to avoid jeopardizing their tax-exempt status, many
reform proposals seek to limit electoral activity beyond the sweep of
the Internal Revenue Code. This is because the tax code draws its
primary line around partisan advocacy, while the reform proposals
focus instead on activity surrounding elections.
There are serious reasons to resist the claim that black political
participation can only be enhanced by campaign finance reform,
given that black voters and candidates are greatly outspent and
outmuscled in the struggle for campaign dollars. Focusing on
potential restrictions on electoral activity might raise doubts about
casting aside First Amendment concerns over reform-inspired
limitations on campaign money. Most notably, portions of the
McCain-Feingold bill give rise to concern about the future of churchcentered activism and "knock-and-drag" campaigns. 35 While the
current congressional debates leave uncertain what reform might be
legislated, if any, it is nonetheless worth examining the potential
impact of the legislation, even in its current early stages, for sources
of concern. When examined from the perspective of the potential
impact of reform legislation on proven avenues of black political
mobilization, the most threatening limitation that emerges
immediately would be potential restrictions on the traditional activity
of black churches resulting from section 214 of the McCain-Feingold
bill. That section amends the definition of "coordinated activity"
from 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) and expands its definition to include "anything
of value provided by a person in connection with a federal candidate's
election ... (regardless of whether the value being provided is in the

form of a communication that expressly advocates a vote for or
34. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 29 (using party machinery to organize a forum of black
voters for Hillary Clinton); Wilgoren, supra note 29 (noting the meeting of black ministers
held at the White House the week before the election). Al Gore himself made numerous
campaign stops at black churches as the election approached.
35. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Congress §§ 101(b),
214(c) (2001), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
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against a candidate). ' 36
"Coordination" also includes direct
participation in fundraising or receiving contributions for a candidate;
and extends to in-kind professional services: all of which could be
interpreted to reach church activity.3 7
Anything of value provided in coordination with a candidate
under these provisions is considered a campaign contribution and is
subject to the limit on campaign expenditures. The unexplored
implications of such reform could reach as far as the activities of nonpartisan institutions, such as churches, that assist in voter mobilization
campaigns in cooperation with political parties. Although section
214's clearest prohibitions relate to promoting candidates for federal
office-an activity that should already be avoided by tax-exempt
organizations-its further reaches could include many of the
functions that have become a hallmark of black political mobilization.
It is difficult to predict with certainty what the effects of
proposed reforms would be as a result of uncertainty over what would
count as a "coordinated activity" under (iii). However, if one takes a
snapshot of some of the mechanisms that have been employed to
energize black voter participation, it is not difficult to imagine an
argument that some of the most significant efforts made in the 2000
election might be in jeopardy. Thus, it is by no means a stretch of
statutory construction to argue that appearances at a church might be
seen as something of "value" that has been "coordinated" with the
candidate. One need only examine some particulars from the last
election to see ready examples. Last September, for example, before
the Church of God in Christ's (COGIC) annual meeting in New
York, Bill Clinton made a plea on behalf of Al Gore and Hillary
Clinton.
While the presiding bishop did not directly endorse Al
Gore or Hillary Clinton, COGIC did pool 400 congregations of black
voters as a forum for Hillary Clinton. 9 Because he was not a
candidate himself, Bill Clinton's appearance may fall outside the act.
However, his wife's subsequent appearance before a forum of
congregants was clearly coordinated with her and had obvious value.
Similarly, candidates regularly appear at church services on the
Sundays leading up to election day to speak to voters-a practice that
is, of course, not limited to Democratic candidates and black
churches. Nonetheless, including these traditional forms of outreach
to black communities within restricted campaign conduct would
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id.
See id. §§ 214(a)(1)(C), (D).
Ross, supranote 29.
Id.
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severely hamper the ability of candidates to reach black voters and
would decrease the presence and impact of black voters in elections.
Even absent specific advocacy on behalf of a candidate, "knockand-drag" efforts might also be treated as campaign contributions
In the November 2000 election, the
under McCain-Feingold.
Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People, led by Reverend
Philip Cousin, used local church vans to transport people-mostly the
older voters-to the polls.4° Though traditionally Democratic in their
leanings, the group properly claims that its primary aim is to combat
apathy rather than to advocate on behalf of specific candidates and
parties.4 ' Would this fall within the prohibitions of (iii)? Again the
answer is unclear. As long as black voters continue to vote in a
particular manner, for example a nine-to-one margin of preference
for one candidate over another, driving them to the polls provides
something of value to a particular candidate. If the effort is
supported by a partisan effort or political campaign in any way, or if
discussions about targets for get-out-the-vote campaigns are held with
any campaign officials, then this activity may also become
endangered. The same holds true for voter registration drives and
stumping from the pulpit for particular candidates. Precisely because,
as Professor Smith notes, blacks are not swing voters, any attempt to
mobilize, energize, and organize their vote can be seen as providing a
benefit to a particular candidate. The questions will then center on
the issue of "coordination," and black political activists would have to
use care to avoid even the slightest appearance of what, under this
proposed system, would be considered improper.
The activities of a Lansing, Michigan church serve as an excellent
example of the problems engendered in politics from the pulpit under
a campaign finance regime. The sermon given on the Sunday before
election day opened with a reminder to vote on Tuesday.4' Perhaps
this reminder could be viewed as nothing more than traditional civic
efforts by a middle-class congregation that had a history of service to
the community, including voter registration efforts. However, those
in attendance also received two African-American published
newsletters endorsing numerous candidates. 43 The minister of the
church, Reverend Murphy, had been invited to the White House the

40. Suzanne Smalley, Parties' Big Job Now is to Get Voters to Polls, HERALD-SUN
(Durham, NC), Nov. 7,2000, at A4.
41. 1L
42. See Wilgoren, supra note 29.
43. Id
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week before the election and enlisted to help get out the vote. 44 He
hosted a prayer luncheon with local leaders and personally
campaigned door to door in black communities. 45 While an ardent
Democrat himself, Reverend Murphy refrained from mentioning the
names and political parties of candidates from his pulpit. 46 Could
McCain-Feingold reach such conduct? Is it possible that a reform law
would focus on the known political affiliation of Reverend Murphy,
the likely political affiliation of his congregants, and his invitation to
the White House to infer some coordination-if not with Vice
President Gore himself, then with some arm of his campaign?
While churches arguably should be barred from coordination
with candidates and parties, expanding the definition of restricted
campaign activity would serve to vitiate the already limited political
leverage these groups had. By visiting the White House, Reverend
Murphy gave the Democrats the opportunity to receive something of
value: help with black turnout in the swing state of Michigan. In
return, the Democrats gave him an opportunity to present and
express the concerns of his community and perhaps someday call on
the White House for a favor. In the context of the African-American
community, this quid pro quo may be seen benignly or even positively
as providing a voice for an underrepresented minority. In reality,
however, it differs little from the more traditional targets of campaign
finance reform: wealthy individuals who donate money in exchange
for a friendly ear in powerful places, or simply an opportunity to
plead their case. And, given the sweep of proposed reforms, such
activity might find itself vulnerable to attack.
It is, of course, possible to dismiss these arguments as those
consistent with the views of someone who has been publicly skeptical
over both the constitutionality of many proposed reforms and their
likely efficacy in truly curbing the influence of money in the political
process. Of late, however, the same concerns have been expressed by
insiders to the political process, much more schooled in the real world
techniques of political effectiveness. It is noteworthy that as the
McCain-Feingold Senate bill made its way to the House for further
consideration, a group of black and Hispanic Democrats announced
their potential opposition to the measure as drafted for fear that it
would undo advances in minority political participation. In the words
of Representative Albert Wynn, the head of a committee created by
the Congressional Black Caucus, "Florida made all of us aware of
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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what goes on at the street level, the need for voter registration for
example." Without the ability to use soft money for the get-out-the
vote efforts, "I'm concerned about the adverse effects on voter
'
registration, voter mobilization."47
Much of this assessment must of course take the form of a
hypothetical. We are obviously still a long way from legislation and
the certain judicial review that will follow. But if we focus on the
potential impact of campaign finance reform on the more plebian
forms of voter mobilizations, such as with black voters, two points
emerge. First, sweeping attempts to curtail the role of money in
politics may have all sorts of paradoxical effects.48 One effect might
be to curtail grassroots activism that has proved surprisingly effective,
even if not at the apex of campaign expenditures. Second, the
experience of black political mobilization in Election 2000 should
raise cautions about discounting or even jettisoning the First
Amendment protections of freedom of expression and association.
To continue with the movie imagery employed by Professor Smith,
albeit at a more prosaic level, should campaign finance reform
threaten the viability of renewed black voter engagement, "who you
gonna call? '49 I suspect that friends of black political participation
will quickly turn to the First Amendment.

47. Alison Mitchell, Blacks and Hispanics in House Balk on Campaign Finance Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9,2001, at Al.
48. This is the central theme of Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 13, which argues that
one of the consequences of restricting the flow of money to candidates and parties would
be to increase the political centrality of other actors in the political arena, such as
purveyors of issue advertising. Issacharoff & Karlan, supranote 13, at 1708-17.
49. This is the limited insight that I draw from GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures
1984).
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